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BANKRUPTCY REFORM AND 
HOMEOWNERSHIP RISK 
Melissa B. Jacoby* 
The personal bankruptcy system is part of a larger system of 
household risk management.  Much of the discussion about personal 
bankruptcy has focused on bankruptcy’s insurance role with respect 
to unsecured obligations like credit cards and medical bills.  The pas-
sage of omnibus bankruptcy legislation coupled with dramatic 
changes in the home mortgage market indicate, however, that it is 
time to devote more study to the role of the bankruptcy system in 
managing home mortgage related risks.  In this article, Professor 
Melissa Jacoby identifies and begins to evaluate chapter 13 as a mort-
gagor protection law.  She explores questions we should ask to deter-
mine whether bankruptcy is prolonging unsustainable homeowner-
ship.  Professor Jacoby then considers the impact of two recent 
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code relating to credit counseling and 
repeat filers.  She concludes that these kinds of revisions may promote 
sorting based on homeownership sustainability. 
I. INTRODUCTION
All U.S. administrations and congresses in recent history have man-
aged some kind of private party risk.1  The personal bankruptcy system 
plays a role in this risk management scheme.  To the extent that legal 
scholarship has evaluated bankruptcy law within this larger framework, it 
has tended to focus on risk associated with unsecured obligations, such as 
credit cards, rent, medical bills, or tort judgments.  Those debates often 
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  For helpful comments on
earlier stages of this project, thanks to Frank Alexander, Scott Baker, Susan DeJarnatt, Mechele 
Dickerson, Jill Family, Adam Feibelman, Elizabeth Gibson, Mary Holder, Kim Krawiec, Keith 
Lundin, Bill Marshall, Richard Myers, Katherine Porter, Steve Rhodes, Mark Weidemaier, Mark 
Weisburd, Bill Whitford, participants in faculty workshops at various law schools in the summer and 
fall of 2006 and participants in the University of Illinois College of Law symposium on Bankruptcy and 
Consumer Credit in the Wake of the 2005 Act.  I also appreciate the research assistance of Elisha 
Johnson and Rachel Miles, the library assistance of Nick Sexton, and the financial support of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina School of Law.  As usual, I take responsibility for all errors.  Special thanks 
to Charles Tabb for inviting me to participate in the symposium. 
1. See generally DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE
RISK MANAGER (2002). 
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have centered on whether and how filers should be screened for the abil-
ity to pay such obligations out of future income or wealth even if they 
would prefer not to pay those debts.2 
In contributing to this symposium, I hope to foster a distinct debate 
about the role of bankruptcy law in managing housing-related risks, par-
ticularly relating to mortgage debt and foreclosure.  The time for this de-
bate is ripe, if not overdue.  The 2005 enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), the impe-
tus for this symposium, represents the most significant revision of the 
Bankruptcy Code in a generation.3  We need to closely examine how 
BAPCPA, as implemented in the real world bankruptcy system, affects 
the use of the system to address various kinds of household financial dis-
tress, including mortgage problems.  In addition, due to dramatic changes 
in the mortgage credit market and a governmental push for increased 
rates of homeownership, a record number of people have obtained mort-
gage credit that would have been unavailable to them several decades 
ago.4  Incurring home mortgage debt has expanded their opportunities, 
but it has also expanded their risk—for many individuals, the largest fi-
nancial risk of their lifetimes.5  Thus, some scholars have suggested that 
2. For examples of proposals, see Jean Braucher & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Means Measure-
ment Rather Than Means Testing: Using the Tax System to Collect from Can-Pay Consumer Debtors 
After Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at 6, 6; Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative The-
ory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1050–51 
(2004); Hung-Jen Wang & Michelle J. White, An Optimal Personal Bankruptcy System and Proposed 
Reforms, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 255–57 (2000). 
3. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
4. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 2005, at 16–17 (2005), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/ 
son2005/son2005_bw.pdf (describing change in home mortgage finance that results in broad array of 
mortgage products); Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 
2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance, FED. RES. BULL., Mar. 22, 2006, at A1, A5–A6 tbl.1, A22 
tbl.8 (2006); Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 HOUS. 
POL’Y DEBATE 533, 534 (2004) (reporting characteristics of subprime borrowers); William C. Apgar & 
Allen J. Fishbein, The Changing Industrial Organization of Housing Finance and the Changing Role of 
Community-Based Organizations 1–2 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper 
BABC 04-09, 2004) (linking technological changes with opportunities and risks for low-income and 
minority borrowers); Zhu Xiao Di & Xiaodong Liu, The Importance of Wealth and Income in the 
Transition to Homeownership 12 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. 
W05-6, 2005) (discussing role in expansion of homeownership of underwriting and products with re-
laxed down payment requirements). 
5. The research on this point is extensive and multidisciplinary.  See Frank S. Alexander, The 
Housing of America’s Families: Control, Exclusion, and Privilege, 54 EMORY L. J. 1231, 1232–33 
(2005); Dennis R. Capozza & Thomas A. Thomson, Optimal Stopping and Losses on Subprime Mort-
gages, 30 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 115, 130 (2005) (noting that weak borrowers have a higher de-
fault rate but impose higher losses per default due to lower sales prices, higher interest expenses, and 
higher legal and maintenance expenses); A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: 
The Homeowner Dilemma, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 49 (2004); Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, 
Measuring the Effect of Subprime Lending on Neighborhood Foreclosures: Evidence from Chicago, 40 
URB. AFF. REV. 362, 385 (2005); Lax et al., supra note 4, at 537–39 (documenting mortgage trends, 
including increasing subprime first mortgages); Orla O’Sullivan, New Foreclosure Phenomenon, ABA 
BANKING J., Nov. 2003, at 77, 77–78 (Nov. 2003) (citing subprime lending as a “key reason” for record 
foreclosures); Apgar & Fishbein, supra note 4, at 2–3, 7 (reporting a rise in subprime lending in both 
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homeownership and mortgage debt “can as easily be a route to poverty 
and debt as a guarantor of financial gain.”6  Just as bankruptcy has be-
come a legal system of last resort for other types of financial distress, it 
may be serving that role for mortgage delinquency as well. 
This article focuses in particular on whether chapter 13 (repayment 
plan) bankruptcy is necessary, desirable, and effective as antiforeclosure 
mortgagor protection, and how two provisions of BAPCPA might alter 
the answer to that question.  In Part II, I start by explaining chapter 13’s 
on-the-books mortgage-protection function: it not only stops a foreclo-
sure, but also allows the filer to try to cure a mortgage arrearage over a 
several year period.7  To the several hundred thousand filers who may be 
pursuing this approach each year, the discharge of personal liability on 
unsecured obligations is likely to be of lesser import.8  This mortgagor 
protection role of chapter 13 has not been well recognized or studied by 
dollar amount and volume stemming from structural changes to industry); Robert G. Quercia et al., 
The Cost-Effectiveness of Community-Based Foreclosure Prevention 2 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for 
Hous. Studies, Working Paper BABC 04-18, 2004) (noting that foreclosure rates of subprime, ARMs 
and subsidized products are higher than the market as a whole).  The timing of foreclosure may be 
different as well for subprime loans.  Capozza & Thomson, supra, at 126–27. 
6. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: Pricing Racial Housing Preferences, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2005) (arguing that data reveal that “middle-class parents can no longer 
afford to pay the segregation tax without placing themselves at risk financially”); Donna Easterlow et 
al., Housing for Health: The Role of Owner Occupation, 15 HOUS. STUD. 367, 379 (2000); Sarah Nettle-
ton & Roger Burrows, When a Capital Investment Becomes an Emotional Loss: The Health Conse-
quences of the Experience of Mortgage Possession in England, 15 HOUS. STUD. 463, 478 (2000) 
(“[T]here is now an urgent need to recognise that for significant numbers of people the costs of home-
ownership in a society marked by increasing levels of individualisation, insecurity and risk can be very 
great, indeed not just in terms of their wealth, but also in relation to their health.”); Eric S. Belsky et 
al., The Financial Returns to Low-Income Homeownership 17 (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. 
Studies, Working Paper No. 05-9, 2005) (“[G]iven the considerable number of years during the study 
period when renting was a better option than owning over a variety of shorter holding periods, the 
constant drum beat for expanded low-income homeownership should be carefully and discriminatingly 
evaluated.”); see also Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evalua-
tion of the Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 96 TUL. L. REV. 373, 378 
(1994) (recommending “that the federal government permit home equity financing without encourag-
ing it”). 
7. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Collecting Debts from the Ill and Injured: The Rhetorical Significance,
but Practical Irrelevance, of Culpability and Ability to Pay, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 229, 266–69 (2001) (dis-
cussing chapter 13’s “home-saving function”).  For more information on chapter 13 filers, see Scott F. 
Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 473 (2006) (reporting on longitudinal study of debtors who filed chapter 13 in 
1994). 
8. Although the proportions vary by district with respect to chapter choice and homeownership,
the available data suggest that roughly 30% of nonbusiness cases are in chapter 13, and about half of 
chapter 13 filers are homeowners.  Raisa Bahchieva et al., Mortgage Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Sus-
tainability of Homeownership, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 73 (Patrick Bolton & Howard 
Rosenthal eds., 2005) (finding that a bankrupt homeowner is almost 50% more likely to choose chap-
ter 13 than chapter 7); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Who Uses Chapter 13?, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 
IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 279–80 tbls.2 & 3 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al. eds., 2003) (finding in 
regression that the largest single effect on chapter choice is homeownership among samples of debtors 
from 1981, 1991, and 1999).  Norberg and Velkey’s repeat filing findings, however, suggest that the 
actual number of people using chapter 13 is smaller than the filing rate suggests because many indi-
viduals are filing multiple petitions.  See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 496–503. 
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real estate scholars.9  Indeed, some real estate finance researchers have 
suggested a federal override of state foreclosure laws to reduce the mort-
gagor protection offered by state law without acknowledging that chapter 
13 has long been a federal override in the opposite direction.10  If nothing 
else, this article prompts those scholars to pay attention to chapter 13. 
In Part III, I consider whether chapter 13 is a sensible component of 
the overall mortgage debt risk management scheme.  To fully explore 
this issue, we will need to know more about how the existence of chapter 
13 affects lending and workout decisions, and must compare chapter 13 
to alternate antiforeclosure interventions such as loss mitigation pro-
grams, mandatory foreclosure insurance, emergency loan and other 
community organization antiforeclosure approaches, and state laws.11  
Although in-depth research on these issues is beyond the scope of the 
agenda-setting discussion in Part III, I conclude that there is a risk that 
chapter 13 has been prolonging unsustainable homeownership in certain 
situations. 
In Part IV, I discuss how two BAPCPA provisions could produce 
more upfront screening of homeownership sustainability.  One provision 
conditions bankruptcy eligibility on receipt of a credit counseling brief-
ing.12  The second provision requires early judicial review of the circum-
stances of repeat filers.  Although the drafting is less than ideal, provi-
sions of this nature have the potential to encourage use of more targeted 
antiforeclosure interventions when appropriate and to discourage home 
saving in chapter 13 when doing so is likely futile. 
9. See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonju-
dicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1403–11 (2004).  But see Frank S. Alexander, Federal Inter-
vention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 319 (1993) 
(recognizing that bankruptcy law stays foreclosures and gives debtors the opportunity to cure a mort-
gage default); id. at 323 (noting that federal legislation that indirectly displaces portions of state real 
estate law have made real estate finance practice more complex). 
10. In 1990, Clauretie and Herzog, a finance professor and an FHA actuary, respectively, pro-
posed that Congress provide a federal override of state foreclosure laws to prevent state mortgagor 
protection provisions from creating large losses.  Terence M. Clauretie & Thomas Herzog, The Effect 
of State Foreclosure Laws on Loan Losses: Evidence from the Mortgage Insurance Industry, 22 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 221, 229, 231 (1990).  In another article, Clauretie and Jameson, another 
finance professor, studied the timing of the foreclosure process to determine whether lenders have 
insufficient incentives to proceed expeditiously through the process, with no acknowledgement that 
chapter 13 could delay the process without the mortgagee’s consent.  See Terrence M. Clauretie & Mel 
Jameson, Interest Rates and the Foreclosure Process: An Agency Problem in FHA Mortgage Insurance, 
57 J. RISK & INS. 701 (1990). 
11. For the importance of comparing bankruptcy to other risk management schemes, see Adam
Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 129, 131 (2005) (“[S]cholars of social insurance have largely neglected the connections between 
their own field and the operation of consumer bankruptcy law . . . [and] economists have been very 
slow to consider these issues as well.”); id. at 157 (noting the omission of the bankruptcy system from 
otherwise comprehensive comparative social insurance studies); id. at 161 (“[S]ome scholars of social 
insurance have addressed this question with respect to nonbankruptcy social insurance programs, but 
they have not factored the role of bankruptcy into their evaluations.”).  See also Kartik Athreya, Un-
employment Insurance and Personal Bankruptcy, ECON. Q., Spring 2003, at 33, 33. 
12. See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106, 119 Stat. 23, 37–38 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h));
id. § 302, 119 Stat. at 75 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)). 
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II. CHAPTER 13 AND MORTGAGOR PROTECTION: THE BASIC LEGAL
MECHANISM 
Given the relative obscurity of chapter 13 to general readers, a few 
words are in order about this chapter’s mortgagor protection features. 
When a defaulting mortgage borrower is adamant to keep a home, and 
the mortgagee is adamant to pursue foreclosure, a chapter 13 repayment 
plan has legal tools that chapter 7 does not.13 
When a defaulting mortgage borrower files for bankruptcy, an in-
junction known as the “automatic stay” almost always will stop a foreclo-
sure in its tracks.14  Unlike chapter 7, chapter 13 permits a defaulting 
mortgage borrower to propose a plan to cure the mortgage arrearage 
over time while she continues with regular mortgage payments in accor-
dance with the contract.15  If the plan satisfies chapter 13’s statutory and 
case law requirements and conforms to local norms, a mortgagee’s objec-
tion to the plan is not determinative.16  Assuming the court confirms the 
filer’s plan, the automatic stay continues to protect the borrower until the 
plan is completed or the plan fails and the case is dismissed or con-
verted.17  Thus, chapter 13 overrides mortgagees’ contractual and state 
law rights to pursue foreclosure.  Chapter 13 relief is not waivable in ad-
vance, and thus the chapter’s mortgagor protection components are a 
tacit part of every mortgage loan agreement. 
As noted in the introduction, chapter 13’s antiforeclosure elements 
have not received as much attention as they probably should.  When 
economists have studied the relationship between bankruptcy and home 
mortgage credit, they have focused on the protection of nonexempt 
home equity from unsecured creditors rather than on foreclosure preven-
tion.18  As a practical matter, it is important to study the antiforeclosure 
aspects of chapter 13 and not just the equity protection aspects because 
13. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67
AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 542 (1993) (“Lawyers say that the number one reason to use chapter 13 is the 
need to save the home by paying arrearages on a home mortgage.”); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once Is Not 
Enough: Preserving Consumers’ Rights to Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J. 455, 495 (1999) (refer-
ring to home saving over objection of a foreclosing lender as “chapter 13’s greatest significance”); 
Henry E. Hildebrand III, Consumer Corner: The Sad State of Mortgage Service Providers, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Sept. 2003, at 10 n.3 (noting that chapter 13 trustees report that home saving is “the” principal 
reason they see debtors filing chapter 13). 
14. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000). 
15. Id. § 1322(b)(5). 
16. Id. §§ 1325(a), 1327(a) (providing for judicial approval of plan that meets statutory criteria
regardless of creditors’ position). 
17. Id. § 362(c) (describing duration of automatic stay).  For a discussion of the resolution of
chapter 13 plans, see infra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
18. A nondefaulting mortgage borrower (or outright homeowner) who has home equity to pro-
tect might file chapter 13 to pay unsecured creditors out of future income and to receive a discharge if 
she finishes her repayment plan.  For research reaching different conclusions, compare Jeremy Ber-
kowitz & Richard Hynes, Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Market for Mortgage Loans, 42 J. L. & 
ECON. 809 (1999), with Emily Lin & Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy and the Market for Mortgage and 
Home Improvement Loans, 50 J. URB. ECON. 138 (2001). 
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the available empirical data suggest that the equity-rich bankruptcy filer 
is a rare occurrence.19 
Chapter 7, the more frequently utilized bankruptcy option for indi-
viduals, is also relevant to housing policy even though its primary func-
tion—the discharge—relates to unsecured debt.  Consider a borrower 
who has not (yet) defaulted on a mortgage but is having serious financial 
trouble, or a borrower who has defaulted on a mortgage but has reached 
an agreement with her mortgagee.  These borrowers might file chapter 7 
to discharge unsecured debt, leaving them with more available income to 
make their mortgage payments and less likely to have their homes en-
cumbered by judgment liens.  A defaulting mortgage borrower also 
might use chapter 7 to part with her home in the hopes of obtaining a 
better sale price than a state law process would command.20  Or, a former 
homeowner might use chapter 7 to shed personal liability on a deficiency 
judgment from a foreclosure prior to bankruptcy.21 
All of these approaches to dealing with mortgage issues intersect in 
important ways; changing the contours of one option may affect others. 
For conceptual clarity, however, I concentrate on the strongest form of 
mortgagor protection that federal bankruptcy law offers, namely the 
antiforeclosure feature of chapter 13.22 
III. CHAPTER 13 MORTGAGOR PROTECTION AND UNSUSTAINABLE
HOMEOWNERSHIP 
Chapter 13 generally seems to enjoy support among many bank-
ruptcy professionals.  Even when system insiders or scholars criticize 
chapter 13, they rarely question the justification for chapter 13’s strong 
19. In an analysis of homeowners in the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, Bahchieva, Wa-
chter, and Warren found that 2001 filers’ homes were highly leveraged and more so than those who 
filed for bankruptcy in 1991; one third reported having no home equity at all (e.g., mortgage debt 
equaled or exceeded home values), and more than 60% had loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of 90% or 
higher.  See Bahchieva et al., supra note 8, at 96–97.  The high LTV ratios were not due to short tenure 
in homes.  See id. at 97 tbl.4.9.  The filers’ mean mortgage debt had increased about 17% from the time 
of home purchase to the time of the bankruptcy filing.  Id. at 94 (reporting mean mortgage debt of 
$88,000 at time of home purchase and $103,000 at bankruptcy filing).  Home-owning debtors in the 
1991 CBP had a median home equity of $5500.  TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE 
CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 200, 221 (2000). 
20. See Richard H. W. Maloy, “She’ll Be Able to Keep Her Home, Won’t She?” The Plight of a
Homeowner in Bankruptcy, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 315, 332–33 (explaining the options available to 
homeowners under Chapter 7); cf. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Eco-
nomic Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REV. 959, 959 (1993) 
(noting foreclosure sale prices are inadequate, causing debtor to lose home equity or exposing debtor 
to deficiency judgment); Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift from Power to Process: A Functional Approach 
to Foreclosure Law, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77 (1996) (discussing lender appropriation of debtor equity in 
state foreclosure). 
21. For data on filers who lost their homes prior to filing for bankruptcy, see Bahchieva et al.,
supra note 8, at 93. 
22. See supra text accompanying notes 14–17. 
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form of federal antiforeclosure protection.23  Some scholars have sug-
gested that chapter 13 does not go far enough to prevent home loss trig-
gered by default on certain kinds of mortgage products.24  It is possible 
that proposals to enhance chapter 13’s antiforeclosure protection will 
prove to be desirable.  But first we should take a closer and more critical 
look. 
A. Does Chapter 13 Promote Unsustainable Homeownership?
The real estate finance literature suggests that mortgage creditors 
should want to enter into workouts with sustainable homeowners be-
cause workouts in such circumstances are cheaper than foreclosure.25  By 
contrast, terminating the lending relationship is preferable if the home-
23. As a slightly different matter, scholars have raised questions about whether home mortgage
debt has contributed to the financial collapse of households and thus whether it is sensible for bank-
ruptcy filers to fight to keep their homes.  See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 200 (“For some, the 
refusal to abandon a home that is no longer affordable brings them to collapse.”); Braucher, supra 
note 13, at 542 (indicating, through interviews with lawyers, that it was difficult to convince debtors to 
give up their home even when they had no home equity and it would be much cheaper to rent); 
Dickerson, supra note 5, at 46 (referring to the “sunk cost trap” that leads people to “cling to their 
past decisions and then incrementally make overly optimistic but good faith decisions”); Patricia A. 
McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725, 728 (2005) (applying 
prospect theory to individuals’ fear of home loss); see also Hazel Christie, Mortgage Arrears and Gen-
der Inequalities, 15 HOUSING STUD. 877, 896 (2000) (reporting reluctance of households with children 
to move notwithstanding house-related financial problems in a U.K. study). 
24. See, e.g., DeJarnatt, supra note 13, at 497; Dickerson, supra note 5, at 51–55 (proposing that
refinance loans be treated differently than purchase money loans); Forrester, supra note 6, at 379, 452; 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy’s Home Economics, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 43, 50 (2004) (sup-
porting a slightly different proposal than Dickerson); Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the 
American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 33–37 (2004). 
25. See, e.g., Brent W. Ambrose & Charles A. Capone, Jr., Cost-Benefit Analysis of Single Fam-
ily Foreclosure Alternatives, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 105, 106 (1996) (“Secondary market agen-
cies and insurers are now actively encouraging the use of foreclosure alternatives to control losses on 
mortgage defaults . . . .”); Ko Wang et al., Nondiscriminating Foreclosure and Voluntary Liquidating 
Costs, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 959, 960–61, 976 (2002) (theorizing that “a bank should be more likely to 
work out a solution with the mortgage borrower than to foreclose” and finding that “a bank is more 
likely to negotiate with borrowers when the liquidating cost is high”); Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. 
Green, Innovating Servicing Technology: Smart Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 9 (Freddie 
Mac Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004) (“Workout options have been widely adopted throughout the 
mortgage industry, and home retention workouts have risen dramatically in recent years.”); id. at fig.3 
(tracking growth of workouts among FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae loans); see also Apgar & 
Fishbein, supra note 4, at 38 (“[M]any large lender/servicers are partnering with [community based 
organizations] to develop more effective foreclosure avoidance efforts.”); Quercia et al., supra note 5, 
at 10 (describing workout programs, and citing an unpublished study finding that the Minneapolis pro-
gram saves “industry players an average of $16,000 per avoided foreclosure”); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and 
Urban Dev., How to Avoid Foreclosure, http://www.hud.gov/foreclosure/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 
30, 2006) (including special forbearance, mortgage modification, partial claim, preforeclosure  sale, 
and deed in lieu of foreclosure, all with conditions).  HUD maintains a list of approved counseling 
agencies to help homeowners in distress.  See Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, 
Remarks Before the Regional Interagency Committee (May 3, 2005) (describing foreclosures as the 
most immediate community development challenge and stressing the need for multidimensional mort-
gage delinquency intervention programs), available at http://www/occ/treas.gov/ftp/release/2005-
94a.pdf; U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., Find a HUD Approved Housing Counseling Agency, 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcc/hccprof14.cfm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006). 
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owner is unsustainable.26  Mortgage loan servicers have technology to as-
sess homeowner sustainability to some extent.27 
If it is cheaper for mortgage creditors to do workouts with sustain-
able borrowers, and if servicers have the technology to identify sustain-
able borrowers, who are the homeowners with mortgage delinquency 
who resort to chapter 13?  One possibility is that the defaulting mortgage 
borrowers who proceed to chapter 13 to save homes from foreclosure are 
the borrowers with the weakest prospects, as they have been turned 
down for a workout and are unable to obtain replacement financing.28 
Readers unfamiliar with chapter 13 may be surprised by the ex-
pense associated with trying to save homes in this system.  Although it is 
difficult to assess these costs in a vacuum (as opposed to comparing them 
with alternative interventions), the chapter 13 price tag may be unduly 
high for solving a discrete mortgage problem, perhaps because chapter 
13 is priced and structured to deal with collective problems.29  The chap-
ter 13 costs include: a growing court filing fee;30 a trustee’s fee;31 a law-
yer’s fee (in the several thousand dollar range);32 a fee for prebankruptcy 
26. See Richard A. Phillips & James H. VanderHoff, The Conditional Probability of Foreclosure: 
An Empirical Analysis of Conventional Mortgage Loan Defaults, 32 REAL EST. ECON. 571, 573 n.4 
(2004) (noting that losses are reduced by foreclosing as quickly as possible in situations where foreclo-
sure is inevitable). 
27. See, e.g., Cutts & Green, supra note 25, at 14–15.  From an analysis of the conditional prob-
ability of foreclosure among home mortgage borrowers in default, Ambrose and Capone concluded 
that lenders who are seeking to maximize profits should “offer[ ] loss-mitigation foreclosure-avoidance 
options only to true trigger-event defaulters who have a demonstrated hardship and commitment to 
the property.”  Brent W. Ambrose & Charles A. Capone, Modeling the Conditional Probability of 
Foreclosure in the Context of Single-Family Mortgage Default Resolutions, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 391, 
407, 428 (1998). 
28. Some courts and trustees have opined that chapter 13’s structure may increase the likelihood
of mortgage reinstatement.  In re Perez, 339 B.R. 385, 391 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).  Yet, this assertion 
is far from universally accepted.  See Gordon Bermant, Chapter 13: Who Pays the Mortgage?, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., June 2001, at 20 (finding no evidence that plans in which ongoing mortgage payments 
are funneled through a trustee are completed at a higher rate). 
29. Feibelman, supra note 11, at 162–63 (reviewing public and private administrative costs of
personal bankruptcy and comparing to other systems).  Norberg and Velkey found that the costs of 
administering chapter 13 were a “sizable portion” of distributions to creditors, ranging from 15% to 
18% of trustee disbursements and, in some years, nearly rivaling the distributions to unsecured credi-
tors.  See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 536 tbl.41. 
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2000). 
31. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of Means, 7
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407, 409 & n.10 (2001) (referring to “hefty administrative expense” of 
chapter 13); Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Distributions and Expenses in Chapter 13, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., May 2000, at 22. 
32. See, e.g., In re Mullings, No. 06-80164, 2006 WL 2130648 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. July 26, 2006)
($3750 “no-look” fee); see also In re Larson, 376 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) ($175 per hour fee); 
In re Murray, 348 B.R. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (explaining chapter 13 fee approval procedures).  
See generally Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed Choices—A 
Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 194 (1997) (noting that chap-
ter 13 legal services generally cost more than chapter 7 legal services, and that “chapter 13 is not nec-
essarily the best buy of legal services”); Braucher, supra note 13, at 550–52 (“My best estimate is that, 
in a majority of chapter 13 cases, lawyers collect at least as much or more as in most chapter 7 cases, 
and that the increased time and overhead is not significant for many lawyers, so that on average a 
chapter 13 case is more lucrative than a chapter 7 case.”). 
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credit counseling and a fee for a postbankruptcy financial management 
course;33 higher cost of credit due to a reduced credit score;34 promised 
repayment of unsecured debt;35 the mortgage arrearage, interest, and on-
going mortgage payments;36 and, of course, all ongoing expenses.  In ad-
dition, the local rules of some districts require that ongoing mortgage 
payments be funneled through chapter 13 trustees, which can add several 
thousand dollars of extra expenses.37  Potential filers’ upfront awareness 
of these costs is unknown and itself deserves closer study.38 
No one has specifically tracked the outcomes for chapter 13 filers 
who file for the purpose of saving their homes from foreclosure, but re-
searchers have collected and analyzed data on chapter 13 outcomes more 
generally.39  In a newly-released longitudinal study, Professors Scott 
Norberg and Andrew Velkey found, consistent with prior studies, that 
two-thirds of the cases in the sample did not result in completed plans.40  
In addition, at least half of the debtors in the sample were cycling 
33. See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 23, 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h));
id. § 106(c) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(g)). 
34. Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Statutory Bankruptcy Re-
form, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 169, 186 (2005). 
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4), (b) (2000).  How much they actually are required to pay to unse-
cured creditors depends in part on whether they had nonexempt equity because chapter 13 filers must 
promise to pay creditors at least as much as they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation.  As 
noted elsewhere, many debtors in the 2001 CBP reported having mortgages that were fully secured or 
undersecured, or had only a bit of equity.  See Bahchieva et al., supra note 8, at 94.  In addition, the 
fact that they promise to commit payment does not mean they pay, especially if they drop out early.  In 
Norberg and Velkey’s study, fully half of the filers ended up paying nothing to general unsecured 
creditors.  See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 544 tbl.46.  Even under BAPCPA, sometimes 
higher-income chapter 13 filers will have minimal or no obligations to pay their unsecured creditors.  
See, e.g., In re Barr, 341 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006) (finding that BAPCPA disposable in-
come rules trump one’s actual ability to pay unsecured debt). 
36. BAPCPA has strengthened the mortgage lender’s entitlement to this treatment.  See 
BAPCPA, § 306(c)(1), 119 Stat. 23, 80–81 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(13A)) (defining debtor’s princi-
pal residence to include mobile homes and to clarify that liens on incidental property do not affect 
treatment of lender’s claim). 
37. See, e.g., In re Perez, 339 B.R. 385, 410 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (calculating extra amount of
payments for debtors who pay mortgage through trustee over sixty-month plan, but concluding that 
none of debtors addressed in plan “deserve to be allowed to make direct payments to their mort-
gagees” (emphasis added)).  See generally Michaela M. White, Direct Payment Plans, 29 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 583, 602–03 (1996). 
38. For a study of how homeowners make decisions pending foreclosure, see Barbara Gross,
Consumer Response to Time Pressure: A Qualitative Study of Homeowners in Foreclosure, 21 ADV. IN 
CONSUMER RES. 120 (1994).  In general, the decision to initiate a bankruptcy is not well understood.  
See Tashira K. Hira & Kyle L. Kostelecky, Pilot Study of Consumer Debtors Provides New Insights—
What Influences Debtors’ Attitudes?, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,  Apr. 1995, at 1, 1 (“[N]o studies have been 
carried out on the decision making process debtors undertake when determining whether to file for 
bankruptcy.”). 
39. The earlier empirical studies of chapter 13 plan completion have been reviewed elsewhere
and need not be rehashed here.  See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 7, at 247–50. 
40. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 505–06 tbls.18 & 19.  Norberg and Velkey studied
795 chapter 13 cases filed in 1994 in seven judicial districts (N.D. Ga., S.D. Ga., M.D.N.C., M.D. Tenn., 
W.D. Tenn., D. Md., W.D. Pa).  These districts comprised almost 20% of all the chapter 13 filings that
year.  See id. app. A at 549–50.  For percentages calculated only from confirmed plans, see id. at 507–
08 tbls.20 & 21. 
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through bankruptcy (and often chapter 13) multiple times.41  In Norberg 
and Velkey’s words, “with each successive filing, the debtor is less likely 
to complete a plan, and more likely to have sought relief without the in-
tent or ability to consummate a plan.”42  It is possible, but unlikely, that 
defaulting mortgage borrowers had a higher rate of plan completion than 
other filers, or that the noncompleters dropped out of chapter 13 only af-
ter having cured their mortgage arrearages.43  Likewise, one would ex-
pect defaulting mortgage borrowers to be more likely, not less likely, to 
file multiple chapter 13 cases than those who are not faced with the pros-
pect of losing their homes.44 
A household-by-household cost-benefit analysis is not the end of 
the story, of course.  Chapter 13 filers neither shoulder all the costs nor 
receive all the benefits of this system.  Unfortunately, it is nearly impos-
sible to characterize the aggregate impact, in part because real estate fi-
nance scholars have not conceptualized chapter 13 as a mortgagor pro-
tection statute.45  Some researchers clearly are aware that bankruptcy 
41. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 497 fig.3.  For a breakdown of previous and subse-
quent filings, see id. at 498 tbl.11. 
42. Id. at 519–20. 
43. Judges, trustees, and lawyers have opined that debtors might be curing secured debt arrear-
ages before dropping out of their plans, in which case it would be possible that they would save their 
homes without plan completion.  See Gordon Bermant, What is “Success” in Chapter 13? Why Should 
We Care?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2004, at 20, 65.  However, “success-by-dismissal stories are 
probably rare.”  Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 
474 (1997).  Nearly 23% of the chapter 13 cases in the Norberg and Velkey sample were dismissed or 
converted (but mostly dismissed) before plan confirmation.  See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 7, at 
506 tbl.18.  A single-court study similarly found that most of the chapter 13 filings in the sample that 
took place on or right before “foreclosure Tuesday”—and thus were likely home-saving-related—were 
dismissed within the first six months.  Michael Catrett, A Month of Debtors: “Foreclosure Tuesday” 
and the Rush to Chapter 13 in the Houston Division of the Southern District of Texas, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., May 2005, at 24, 82–83.  In a study of participants in a foreclosure prevention program, debt-
ors were in arrears for, on average, five or six months of mortgage payments.  See Quercia et al., supra 
note 5, at 20 tbl.7.  Six months is likely too short a time for many defaulting mortgage borrowers to 
cure their arrearages, which is why some nonchapter-13 interventions are not viable.  See DeJarnatt, 
supra note 13, at 496; see also Christie, supra note 23, at 886–87 (discussing the difficulty of making up 
arrears and continuing with regular mortgage payments). 
44. Housing policy scholars have observed recidivism in mortgage troubles outside of bank-
ruptcy.  See generally Quercia et al., supra note 5, at 8, 27 (reporting that a study of mortgage counsel-
ing participants found that “about 40 percent of all borrowers in the program, and about 30 percent 
who avoided foreclosure, reported being late on payments again 12 months after program interven-
tion” and also reporting from literature review that “[e]vidence shows that many borrowers, even if 
they can stave off foreclosure once, may face difficulties again several years later”); Christie, supra 
note 23, at 886–87. 
45. For analyses of state-supplied mortgagor protection statutes, see, for example, Karen Pence,
Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit, REV. ECON. & STAT. (2006) (estimating 
that loan sizes are smaller in judicial foreclosure states and concluding that this reflects a reduced sup-
ply of credit); Terrence M. Clauretie, State Foreclosure Laws, Risk Shifting, and the Private Mortgage 
Insurance Industry, 56 J. RISK & INS. 544, 552 (1989) (concluding that judicial foreclosure, statutory 
right of redemption and antideficiency statutes add significantly to mortgage risk); Clauretie & 
Herzog, supra note 10, at 229, 231 (predicting borrowers in more protective states eventually will pay 
higher private mortgage insurance premiums); Charles M. Kahn & Abdullah Yavas, The Economic 
Role of Foreclosures, 8 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 35, 46 (1994) (arguing that mortgagor protection 
laws have substantial effects on the market); Phillips & VanderHoff, supra note 26, at 584 (proposing 
that less protective laws will reduce costs and will lower interest rates).  Cf. Michael H. Schill, An Eco-
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plays some role, but tend not to build bankruptcy—and certainly not 
chapter 13 in particular—into their analyses.46  Thus, very few real estate 
studies even acknowledge the existence of chapter 13 and its antiforeclo-
sure provisions, let alone try to study its impact or compare it to state law 
and other approaches.47  Perhaps some real estate finance experts cannot 
fathom that defaulting mortgage borrowers would file chapter 13 to save 
their homes when they have zero or negative equity,48 but even many of 
these experts would acknowledge that the determinants of mortgage de-
fault and recovery are not completely understood.49 
nomic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489, 491 (1991) (finding that state mort-
gage protection laws impact interest rates less than prior studies indicated). 
46. See, e.g., Ambrose & Capone, supra note 27, at 407, 422 (discussing a study that included a
bankruptcy variable indicating that debtor filed for some sort of bankruptcy protection).  Ambrose 
and Capone report: 
[B]ankruptcy petitions increase the probability of low-LTV borrower reinstatement by 15 percentage 
points (Table 8).  This again indicates the presence of trigger-event defaulters who are working to save 
their properties.  For high-LTV borrowers, the principal effect appears to be in buying time to either 
sell the property or forestall foreclosure.  The probability of their property sale or foreclosure in-
creases by nearly 4%, while reinstatement rates decline by 2% . . . .  
Id. at 422; see also THE REINVESTMENT FUND FOR THE PA. DEP’T OF BANKING, MORTGAGE FORE-
CLOSURE FILINGS IN PENNSYLVANIA (2005), available at http://www.trfund.com/resourse/downloads/ 
policypubs/mortgage.Forclosure.Filings.pdf; Peter J. Elmer & Steven A. Seelig, Insolvency, Trigger 
Events, and Consumer Risk Posture in the Theory of Single-Family Mortgage Default, 10 J. HOUSING 
RES. 1, 2 (1998). 
47. For some studies that do recognize chapter 13, see Quercia et al., supra note 5, at 22 tbl.9
(discussing a study of the Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention program in Minneapolis, which reported 
that, between 1991 and 2003, the proportion of participants ending up in chapter 13 has been stable at 
around 4%); Cheryl Long, Negative Effects of Personal Bankruptcy for Homeowners: Lost Homes 
and Reduced Credit Access, at 20 (July 11, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Colgate Uni-
versity) (using a limited sample of Panel Study of Income Dynamics data, finding that chapter 7 has a 
“significant and negative effect on homeownership, but the effect of homeownership of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy, although still negative, is no longer significant at the conventional level”). 
48. For the literature on conceptualizing default as a put option, see, for example, Brent W.
Ambrose et al., Optimal Put Exercise: An Empirical Examination of Conditions for Mortgage Foreclo-
sure, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 213 (2001) [hereinafter Ambrose et al., Optimal Put Exercise]; 
Brent W. Ambrose et al., Pricing Mortgage Default and Foreclosure Delay, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 314, 315 (1997) [hereinafter Ambrose et al., Pricing Mortgage Default]; Cutts & Green, su-
pra note 25, at 9–10; Roberto G. Quercia & Michael A. Stegman, Residential Mortgage Default: A Re-
view of the Literature, 3 J. HOUSING RES. 341, 350–51 (1994).  Models of default now take transaction 
costs into account.  See, e.g., Capozza & Thomson, supra note 5, at 115.  They also now recognize that 
foreclosure is only one possible consequence of default.  See Ambrose et al., Pricing Mortgage Default, 
supra, at 315; Ambrose & Capone, supra note 25, at 106; Kahn & Yavas, supra note 45, at 35 (noting 
that foreclosures occur in a small proportion of instances of nonperformance and using the difference 
in rates as a proxy for renegotiation in the analysis); Mickey Lauria et al., An Investigation of the Time 
between Mortgage Default and Foreclosure, 19 HOUSING STUD. 581, 582 (2004); Phillips & Vander-
Hoff, supra note 26, at 572 (reporting that 20% of defaults result in actual foreclosure). 
49. Real estate finance researchers increasingly recognize that borrowers’ continuation of the
mortgage may depend on factors such as job loss, medical problems, or divorce.  See Ambrose & Ca-
pone, supra note 27, at 427–28 (1998); Clauretie, supra note 45, at 548 (including variable for trigger 
event in spite of mixed evidence for their role); Elmer & Seelig, supra note 46, at 2; cf. Capozza & 
Thomson, supra note 5, at 126–27, 130 (study of subprime loans finding that trigger events did not play 
expected role); Quercia & Stegman, supra note 48, at 376 (concluding that role of borrower-related 
factors and transaction costs in default remained less clear as of 1994).  Other research explores the 
broader financial climate.  See, e.g., Elmer & Seelig, supra note 46, at 14–15 (referring to entire finan-
cial picture of each consumer); Easterlow et al., supra note 6, at 376 (referring to interest rates and 
macroeconomic climate).  But see Quercia & Stegman, supra note 48, at 374–75 (reporting, as of 1994, 
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Beyond case-by-case and aggregate financial evaluation, it is impor-
tant to consider the psychosocial costs associated with government inter-
vention that prolong unsustainable homeownership.  Debts that enable 
the acquisition of a home can be “a chronic strain on an individual’s fi-
nancial well-being, and ultimately emotional well-being.”50  A growing 
body of literature, largely from the United Kingdom, focuses specifically 
on the health impact of mortgage troubles.51  Scholars have reported a 
connection between mortgage indebtedness and subjective well-being.52  
They also have described “marginal homeownership” or “unsustainable” 
homeownership as a public health issue.53  Thus, it is possible that chap-
ter 13, by prolonging unsustainable homeownership while adding extra 
financial obligations, serves as a pathway through which home mortgage 
indebtedness contributes to adverse health outcomes.54 
that “household income and mortgage payment have been found both to have an effect and no effect 
on default” and concluding that the mixed results arise from lack of adequate panel data). 
50. Patricia Drentea, Age, Debt and Anxiety, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 437, 438, 447 (2000)
(studying credit card debt, but proposing that other types of debt be studied).  A number of papers 
have been written on the relationship between debt, financial strain, and health.  See, e.g., P.R. Duber-
stein et al., Suicide at 50 Years of Age and Older: Perceived Physical Illness, Family Discord and Finan-
cial Strain, 34 PSYCHOL. MED. 137, 142, 144–45 (2004) (reviewing literature showing “significant asso-
ciations of depression in older adults with severe physical illness, financial strain and relationship 
difficulties” and finding mixed results depending on type of regression, but concluding that “[f]inancial 
adversity and family discord, particularly in the context of a mental disorder, should alert healthcare 
providers to the possibility of suicide risk”); Angela C. Lyons & Tansel Yilmazer, Health and Financial 
Strain: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 71 S. ECON. J. 873, 888 (2005) (finding 
“[t]here is little evidence that financial strain contributes to poor health suggesting that it is unlikely 
that large financial burdens accelerate a decline in health status” but “[i]t may be the case that finan-
cial strain may significantly increase the probability of poor health for those with serious health condi-
tions”); Barbara O’Neill et al., Financially Distressed Consumers: Their Financial Practices, Financial 
Well-being and Health, 16 FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 73, 79–80, 82 (2005) (summarizing a study of 
debt management plan participants that found a positive association between health status and rec-
ommended financial behaviors—“respondents who reported poorer health are more likely to perceive 
their health is affected by financial problems than those in very good health”—as well as finding the 
association varies with age, employment status and family size); Richard Reading & Shirley Reynolds, 
Debt, Social Disadvantage and Maternal Depression, 53 SOC. SCI. & MED. 441, 442 (2001) (citing stud-
ies finding associations between health and financial problems, money worries and housing tenure). 
51. See, e.g., JANET FORD ET AL., HOME OWNERSHIP IN A RISK SOCIETY 153–68 (2001); Christie, 
supra note 23, at 898–901; Easterlow et al., supra note 6; Sarah Nettleton & Roger Burrows, Mortgage 
Debt, Insecure Home Ownership, and Health: An Exploratory Analysis, 20 SOC. OF HEALTH & 
ILLNESS 731 (1998); Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 6. 
52. See Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 51, at 738–43; see also John Cairney & Michael H.
Boyle, Home Ownership, Mortgages and Psychological Distress, 19 HOUSING STUD. 161, 162–63 (2004) 
(discussing Canadian study of differences between homeownership with mortgage debt and home-
ownership without). 
53. See, e.g., Roger Burrows, Mortgage Indebtedness in England: An ‘Epidemiology,’ 13 HOUS-
ING STUD. 5, 6 (1998) (“There is good evidence to suggest that the experience of mortgage arrears is 
such a stressful life event and is now so common that it could usefully be reconceptualised as a major 
public health issue.”); Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 6, at 478. 
54. See Cairney & Boyle, supra note 52, at 172 (referring to the importance of elaborating on the 
terms of housing tenure to clarify pathways between homeownership and health). 
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B. The (Sustainable Homeownership) Case for Chapter 13?
Taken together, the assumptions and factors explored in the prior 
section invite greater scrutiny of chapter 13 as mortgagor protection.  But 
the assumptions themselves deserve greater scrutiny.  It is an empirical 
question whether mortgage servicers offer workout options to all sus-
tainable defaulting mortgage borrowers.  There are many reasons why 
defaulting borrowers may not be able to get workouts outside of bank-
ruptcy.  A mortgage servicer may take a narrow view of sustainability, 
both in terms of the surplus income to be eligible and the length of time 
over which an arrearage must be paid.  Servicers may randomly decline 
workouts to sustainable borrowers due to moral hazard concerns.55  Sto-
ries have circulated of seemingly arbitrary acts of servicers, negligent ser-
vicing, or aggressive pursuit of foreclosure to appropriate debtors’ eq-
uity.56  Chapter 13 may provide at least a limited check on servicer 
activity that is inconsistent with governmental and societal promotion of 
homeownership.57  In addition, even if a defaulting borrower could ob-
tain substitute financing to address the foreclosure, the direct costs of do-
ing so could be considerable and, thus, may decrease sustainability. 
Also, for individuals with mortgage delinquency as well as other debt 
problems, the costs and risks associated with bankruptcy’s collective fo-
rum are somewhat more justified. 
For defaulting mortgage borrowers who cannot get a private work-
out, notwithstanding a reasonable prospect of curing the arrearage, the 
existence of chapter 13 may reduce psychosocial costs with respect to sus-
tainable defaulting mortgage borrowers.  Some studies have found that 
renters tend to have worse health than homeowners with mortgages.58  
The litany of oft-mentioned benefits of homeownership need not be re-
peated here, but homeownership is thought to offer more than physical 
shelter; it is positively associated with wellbeing,59 and provides a source 
55. Some research suggests that lenders should randomly reject requests for loan workouts to
avoid having to screen for actual borrower distress, but that lenders are more likely to do this if their 
policies are not observable.  See Wang et al., supra note 25, at 976; see also Ambrose & Capone, supra 
note 25, at 117. 
56. See Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING
POL’Y DEBATE 753, 756–58 (2004); Duncan Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis of Debtor Protection 
Rules in Sub-prime Market Default Situations (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working 
Paper No. BABC 04-02, 2004) (comparing “high road” and “low road” creditors’ willingness to invest 
in antiforeclosure devices, depending in part on whether creditors seek to profit from appropriating 
debtors’ equity). 
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000) (setting plan lengths). 
58. See Cairney & Boyle, supra note 52, at 169–70 (“There is a gradient in mental health status
by housing tenure; home owners without mortgages report lower levels of distress than home owners 
with mortgages, who in turn report lower levels of distress than those who live in rental accommoda-
tion.  This effect holds even after controlling for age, gender, marital status, education, income and 
stress.”).  But see Belsky et al., supra note 6, at 17–18. 
59. See, e.g., Cairney & Boyle, supra note 52, at 162; Dickerson, supra note 5, at 20 (“Research
indicates that homeowners feel better about themselves, maintain better and safer neighborhoods, and 
live in neighborhoods that have better schools.”). 
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of “ontological security.”60  When individuals struggle with the fear, or 
the actuality, of home loss, they may experience a “biographical disrup-
tion,” with “profound consequences for a person’s sense of self and social 
identity.”61 
C. Identifying Sustainable Homeowners?
Part III.B suggested that chapter 13 might provide an otherwise un-
available workout option for sustainable homeowners.  Yet, for the rea-
sons explored in Part III.A, the costs of chapter 13 may outweigh the 
benefits as applied to unsustainable homeowners.  A judge is supposed to 
confirm a chapter 13 repayment plan only after finding that “the debtor 
will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the 
plan.”62  This can be interpreted as a tool to sort filers with housing prob-
lems on the basis of sustainability. 
Notwithstanding this feasibility mandate, commentators believe this 
provision has little bite in practice, even in the face of evidence that filers 
are often unsuccessful.63  Prior to BAPCPA, judges spent little time on 
60. Burrows, supra note 53, at 6 (noting circumstances challenging ontological security of home-
ownership); Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 6, at 474–77 (noting that uncertainty and train of events 
out of control “are coming to be regarded as amongst the most crucial determinants of poor health in 
contemporary societies”).  From a study of families in Swinton in the United Kingdom, Christie ob-
served: 
The common experience of mortgage arrears, beyond inadequate income and financial hardship, was 
enforced spatial mobility and exclusion from a range of social networks and services. But beyond 
these physical and material problems the household members also spoke about the emotional trauma 
of being in arrears: the worry that they would not manage, the fear of loosing [sic] their home, the un-
certainty about the future, and the sense of failure.  As Nettleton, et al., argue, problems arose not just 
with the practicalities of what happened but with how it made them feel.  Although the pressures of 
managing on limited resources had repercussions for families and households, the burden often fell 
heavily on individuals, and especially on women.  While impoverishment eroded the autonomy of 
households, and closed down their options, the management and experience of arrears contributed to 
the creation and perpetuation of gender inequalities within the home. 
Christie, supra note 23, at 898 (citation omitted); id. at 901 (“[S]ocial exclusion was a feature of the 
lives of defaulting households.”); see also William M. Rohe & Michael A. Stegman, The Effects of 
Homeownership on the Self-Esteem, Perceived Control and Life Satisfaction of Low-Income People, 60 
J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N. 173, 174–76 (1994). 
61. Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 51, at 746; Nettleton & Burrows, supra note 6, at 474–75
(referring to social isolation, stigma, changed social status, sense of failure and impact on self-
confidence associated with having lost their homes constituting biographical disruption).  The concep-
tion of biographical disruption comes from Michael Bury, Chronic Illness as Biographical Disruption, 
4 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 167, 169 (1982) (“[I]llness, and especially chronic illness, is precisely that 
kind of experience where the structures of everyday life and the forms of knowledge which underpin 
them are disrupted.”).  Bury disaggregates biographical disruption into three components: (1) “disrup-
tion of taken-for-granted assumptions and behaviors,” (2) “more profound disruptions in explanatory 
systems normally used by people, such that a fundamental re-thinking of the person’s biography and 
self-concept is involved,” and (3) a response “involving the mobilization of resources, in facing an al-
tered situation.”  Id. at 169–70. 
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2000). 
63. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or
Treadmill, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065, 1088–89 (2004); LoPucki, supra note 43, at 474–75; Norberg 
& Velkey, supra note 7, at 508–09 (referring to the “heartbeat test” of feasibility).  Even members of 
the U.S. Supreme Court have hinted at the possibility that the feasibility analysis was inadequately 
undertaken.  See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 496–97 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Some 
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front-end screening of personal bankruptcy filers.64  Indeed, some judges 
apparently do not review chapter 13 plans at all.  They have delegated 
this review, in one form or another, to chapter 13 trustees, who do not 
have financial incentives to heavily scrutinize homeownership sustain-
ability.65  Furthermore, whether due to financial incentives or beliefs in 
“last, last chances,” it also seems that debtors’ lawyers are insufficiently 
screening their potential clients for ability to complete a multiyear re-
payment plan. 
Leaving the chapter 13 door wide open does offer some catch-all 
consumer protection.66  At least in the very short term, chapter 13 tem-
pers the impact of the decision to turn unsecured consumer debt into 
mortgage debt and then defaulting on it.67  Chapter 13 buys time for peo-
ple who have misunderstood the terms of their adjustable rate mortgages 
judges and trustees also have made plans less feasible for debtors by requiring that they promise to 
pay certain percentages of unsecured debt, which makes curing the mortgage even more difficult.  
Braucher, supra note 32, at 196.  It is possible, however, that BAPCPA will bring an end to these prac-
tices. 
64. See Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory
Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 598 (2001) (noting that “[j]udges simply don’t spend much time on con-
sumer cases” and explaining why); LoPucki, supra note 43, at 472 (“most [bankruptcy judges and 
chapter 13 trustees] are wedded to the idea that cases must be mass processed and cannot be given 
individual attention”).  Researchers at the Federal Judicial Center found in the 1980s that judges spent 
an average of six minutes per chapter 7 nonbusiness case and twenty-three minutes per chapter 13 
case.  See Gordon Bermant et al., A Day in the Life: The Federal Judicial Center’s 1988–1989 Bank-
ruptcy Court Time Study, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 491, 504 tbl.3 (1989).  If the same survey were conducted 
today, one would suspect both that the average would be smaller and, even then, would be skewed 
upward by a very small number of cases that took considerable time.  See Gordon Bermant, A Day in 
Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2003, at 20 (reporting that 4440 chapter 7 cases and 1823 chap-
ter 13 cases are filed on the average working day). 
65. See generally Braucher, supra note 32, at 195–96. 
66. For an earlier iteration of this argument, see generally William C. Whitford, The Ideal of
Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 400 (1994) (“The boom in consumer bankruptcy 
could be seen as an indictment of other supposed consumer remedies—if consumers had other meth-
ods of stopping collection activities they find intolerable, fewer would use bankruptcy.”); id. at 402 (“If 
the debtor claims a defense to a secured claim under the contract or consumer protection legislation, 
however, bankruptcy provides an efficient forum for asserting that claim.  The litigation takes place in 
bankruptcy court, where delays in obtaining a hearing because of case backlog are less common than 
in general civil courts.  Because the consumer debtor has an attorney for the bankruptcy, obtaining 
legal help in asserting the defense is practical.  Often the bankruptcy attorney will assert a defense to a 
secured claim without charging an additional fee to the basic charge for the bankruptcy.”). 
67. See HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra note 4, at 1, 6, (reporting cash-
out of $139 billion in home equity in 2004); Bucks et al., supra note 4, at A29 (noting that 31% in the 
2004 SCF used funds for debt consolidation); Glenn Canner et al., Mortgage Refinancing in 2001 and 
Early 2002, FED. RES. BULL., Dec. 2002, at 469; Kathleen W. Johnson, Recent Developments in the 
Credit Card Market and the Financial Obligations Ratio, FED. RES. BULL., Autumn 2005, at 473, 482 
(hypothesizing that households are substituting mortgage debt for credit card debt); George S. Mas-
nick et al., Emerging Cohort Trends in Housing Debt and Home Equity 26 figs.12 & 13 (Harvard Univ. 
Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. W05-1, 2005) (showing “skyrocketing” in cash-out 
refinances and “sharp increase” in second mortgage borrowing); Richard T. Curtin, National Survey of 
Home Equity Loans, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, WP51 14 (Oct. 1998) (between 
1988 and 1997, finding that “[t]he largest change has been the growing use of second mortgages for the 
consolidation of existing credit card debt”). 
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on the verge of a major reset.68  Chapter 13 also can be seen as a type of 
short-term housing policy for senior citizens who now are more likely to 
carry mortgages and thus run the risk of home loss.69  Homeowners who 
believe they are victims of predatory lending might resort to chapter 13 
while explicit regulation of predatory lending remains mired in contro-
versy.70  But, as of now, chapter 13 has neither a proven track record with 
respect to these functions nor the specific tools that might be required to 
deal with these issues adequately. 
This discussion leads me to conclude, at least tentatively, that even 
if chapter 13 should remain a component of an overall antiforeclosure 
scheme, some additional sustainability-based sorting would be desirable. 
This brings us to BAPCPA’s revisions of the Bankruptcy Code.71
68. For discussion of the growth of ARMs, see Bucks et al., supra note 4, at A29–A30 (noting
that in 2004 SCF, 15% had ARMs, up from 11.4% in 2001); James R. Hagerty, The Home-Mortgage 
Muddle: Some Borrowers Are Confused by Terms of Adjustable-Rate Loans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11–12, 
2006, at B4 (reporting Mortgage Bankers Association statistics that ARMs accounted for about a third 
of mortgages originated in 2004 and 2005); HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra 
note 4, at 16 (indicating that the share of conventional mortgage originations attributed to ARMs was 
18% in 2003 and 35% in 2004).  For an analysis of default risk based on lack of knowledge of terms or 
affordability once the rate is reset, see Erick Bergquist et al., Pipeline, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2000, at 12 
(2005) (reporting that New York ratings agency, Fitch, Inc., anticipated a 10–15% rise in subprime 
delinquencies due to resets and inability to refinance in light of inadequate home value); Brian Bucks 
& Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and Mortgage Terms? 18–20 (Federal 
Reserve Working Paper No. 2006-3, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/ 
2006/200603pop.pdf; Christopher L. Cagan, Mortgage Payment Reset: The Rumor and the Reality 30–
32 (First American Real Estate Solutions, Feb. 8, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.loanperformance.com/infocenter/whilepaper/FARES_resets_whitepaper_021406.pdf.  See 
generally Donald F. Cunningham & Charles A. Capone Jr., The Relative Termination Experience of 
Adjustable to Fixed-Rate Mortgages, 45 J. FIN. 1687, 1702 (1990) (concluding that adjustable rate mort-
gages have a greater default risk and a lower prepayment probability than fixed rate mortgages). 
69. See William C. Apgar & Zhu Xiao Di, Housing Wealth and Retirement Savings: Enhancing
Financial Security for Older Americans, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT 
INCOME (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., forthcoming 2006) (reporting on growth in mortgage debt among 
older Americans that is outpacing growth among younger Americans); Craig Copeland, Debt of the 
Elderly and Near Elderly, 1992–2001, 4 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 2, Apr. 2004, at 1, 3, available 
at http://ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/0404notes.pdf (reporting on the growth in relative magnitude of housing 
payments since 1992, the increase in households with debt payments exceeding 40% of income and 
attributing trends in part to home mortgage refinancing and home equity loans that transform unse-
cured debt into secured debt); Masnick et al., supra note 67, at 2–3, 25 (evaluating mortgage debt 
trends of households reaching retirement age, and exploring elderly households’ use of home equity 
through cash-out refinances and additional loans). 
70. For studies of predatory lending, see, e.g., Apgar & Di, supra note 69 (reporting on equity
stripping and mortgage abuse among older Americans); Apgar & Fishbein, supra note 4, at 1 (noting 
“noticeable uptick in abusive lending practices” involving low-income and minority households); id. at 
12 (“In addition to available survey data, there is a growing body of econometric evidence that mort-
gage brokers do in fact target uninformed borrowers, and that their focus on the subprime market-
place is reinforced by a mortgage delivery system that provides incentives to participants to take ad-
vantage of the situation.”); Belsky et al., supra note 6, at 11. 
71. For an overview of the legislation’s consumer bankruptcy aspects, see generally Charles Jor-
dan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 11–34 
(2001).  For a longer history of consumer bankruptcy development, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The His-
tory of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 32–37 (1995). 
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IV. BAPCPA AND SUSTAINABLE HOMEOWNERSHIP SORTING
A. Credit Counseling
BAPCPA requires a briefing from an approved credit counseling 
service within 180 days prior to filing as a condition for bankruptcy eligi-
bility.72  A requirement relating to prebankruptcy counseling has the po-
tential to channel financially distressed homeowners into a targeted anti-
foreclosure program.  In that instance, a counselor with special expertise, 
and not judges who must handle myriad situations in a court setting, 
would be able to assess a defaulting mortgage borrower’s likelihood of 
curing the mortgage and help achieve a private workout or suggest a vi-
able exit strategy.73  As of now, it is likely that many of the approved 
counseling programs focus on unsecured debt management and will not 
be well-equipped to address mortgage problems.74  Yet, this need not be 
the case. 
Also, judges are required to scrutinize the circumstances of indi-
viduals who file for bankruptcy without the requisite counseling briefing, 
which itself presents a narrow opportunity for sorting defaulting home-
owners.  A debtor who has not received such a briefing must submit a 
waiver request to the court if she wishes to be eligible for bankruptcy.75  
Debtors with many kinds of financial problems, but no foreclosure loom-
ing, should be able to satisfy the credit counseling requirement before fil-
ing, assuming that they know the counseling provision exists.76  Those 
who have a foreclosure scheduled imminently seem more likely to seek a 
court waiver of this requirement.77 
72. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 23, 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1)). 
73. This is the function of mortgage foreclosure prevention programs.  See U.S. Dep’t of Hous.
& Urban Dev., supra note 25. 
74. See Lea Krivinskas, “Don’t File!”: Rehabilitating Unauthorized Practice of Law-Based Poli-
cies in the Credit Counseling Industry, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 51, 70 (2005); David A. Lander, A Snapshot 
of Two Systems that are Trying to Help People in Financial Trouble, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 161, 
186–87 (1999).  For an assessment of the counseling requirement and its likely effectiveness overall, 
see Karen Gross & Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation? Pre-Petition 
Credit Counseling and Post-Petition Financial Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
549, 554 (2005). 
75. See BAPCPA § 106(a), 119 Stat. at 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)).  The statute
also specifies circumstances under which the requirement will not apply at all, but they are limited, and 
I do not review them in this article. 
76. Although not the topic of this article, this assumption of knowledge of the provision should
not go unchallenged.  In addition to pro se filers, some debtors apparently have underprepared law-
yers who have not ensured that their clients have satisfied BAPCPA’s requirements.  See, e.g., In re 
Collins, 335 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (represented debtor dismissing and refiling fifth 
case at time of law change without preparing to rebut presumption applicable in repeat filings); In re 
Skarbek, No. 05-9002b, 2005 WL 3348879, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2005) (lawyer conflating 
credit counseling requirement with financial management course requirement); In re Collins, 334 B.R. 
655, 656 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (represented debtor voluntarily dismissed chapter 13 and filed chap-
ter 7 next day, became entangled in new repeat filing provisions, and failed to serve creditors with no-
tice of request for automatic stay extension). 
77. For post-BAPCPA credit counseling cases involving looming home loss, see, for example, In 
re Dixon, 338 B.R. 383 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); In 
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The statute explicitly delegates to judges the power to decide, 
within some limits, whether the waiver is warranted.78  The limits operate 
as a one-way ratchet; when the statute is clear, this usually means the 
judge is required to eject the defaulting mortgage borrower from bank-
ruptcy.79  When more judicial discretion is required, it generally will re-
late to whether the debtor’s certification has described “exigent circum-
stances that merit a waiver” that is “satisfactory to the court.”80  An 
important dimension of the “exigent circumstances” inquiry should be 
whether bankruptcy will serve some otherwise unavailable insurance 
function for the debtor if initiated today.81  A debtor should not have exi-
gent circumstances that merit a waiver simply because a foreclosure is 
scheduled.82 
I must be realistic about the scope and impact of this alleged sorting 
opportunity.  First, some (although not all) judges already seem disin-
clined to interpret “exigent circumstances” in the way I have described.83  
Indeed, some judges believe the provision is foolish and have expressed 
frustration when its application requires ejecting a defaulting mortgage 
borrower from bankruptcy.84  Although this provision is clearer than oth-
ers in BAPCPA, the language still leaves room for consequential statu-
re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In 
re Mingueta, 338 B.R. 833 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006); In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006); 
In re Miller, 336 B.R. 232 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005); 
In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005). 
78. BAPCPA § 106(a), 119 Stat. at 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(B)). 
79. In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005); In re Wallert, 332 B.R. at 888–89
(“[T]here is literally no other possible outcome, when the very specific, nondiscretionary terms of the 
Act are applied just as they read. . . . [T]he structuring of this requirement was a matter of policy, 
committed in the first instance to Congress and not one that the courts may second-guess on its mer-
its.”). 
80. See BAPCPA § 106(a), 119 Stat. at 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)(i)) (emphasis
added). 
81. See, e.g., In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. at 882–83 (refusing to approve counseling waiver because
chapter 7 contains no tools to fix on longer term basis the debtor’s problem, and thus filing was not 
exigent); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (2000). 
82.  See In re Dixon, 338 B.R. at 388 (upholding the bankruptcy court’s finding, on an abuse of
discretion standard, that debtor did not show exigent circumstances sufficient to merit a waiver when 
state law provided twenty days notice of foreclosure sale); In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. at 700 (holding that 
imminent foreclosure, while constituting an exigent circumstance, does not merit a waiver).  This pro-
vision should be seen as analogous to a court considering whether to lift the automatic stay because 
property is not necessary for an effective reorganization.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B).  There, the 
court evaluates not only whether the property is theoretically necessary, but whether that reorganiza-
tion is reasonably possible.  See United Sav. Ass’n of Texas vs. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 
U.S. 365, 375–76 (1988). 
83. For example, in the District of Maryland and elsewhere, a claim of exigent circumstances
requires only the assertion that the debtor is facing a looming event, such as foreclosure, and not an 
assessment of how the debtor got into the situation or how the bankruptcy case will help.  See In re 
Childs, 335 B.R. 623 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (per curiam); In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
2005) (holding that sheriff’s sale is an exigent circumstance whether or not exigency is self-created or 
created by other factors). 
84. See, e.g., In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 115 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005); Judges Openly Criticize New
Law; Opinions Interpreting BAPCPA Amendments Offer Harsh Reviews, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, 
Mar. 16, 2006. 
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tory interpretation.  For example, the debtor requesting a waiver must 
submit a “certification.”85  Many judges interpret “certification” to re-
quire formalities and explicit detail,86  while others are more flexible re-
garding both substance and form.87  Courts can disagree on whether the 
statute creates a waiting period between requesting counseling services 
and filing a bankruptcy petition.88  Judges also affect the sorting impact 
of this provision by establishing the consequences of ineligibility, with 
most courts dismissing the case but some courts “striking” the case.89  
The ways in which judges handle such issues alter the capacity of the 
provision to serve as a screen for sustainable homeownership.  Addition-
ally, appellate courts will likely review a bankruptcy court’s handling of a 
waiver under a highly deferential standard and, thus, may not provide a 
meaningful check on less stringent applications of the meaning of “exi-
gent circumstances that merit a waiver.”90
Furthermore, the screening opportunities offered by this provision 
are incomplete.  Many filers who do not comply with the counseling re-
85. See BAPCPA § 106(a), 119 Stat. at 37 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A)). 
86. See, e.g., In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 155 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (requiring certification to
contain names of agencies contacted, manner in which debtor contacted agencies, and responses of 
agencies); In re Mingueta, 338 B.R. 833, 837 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and stat-
ing that “[a]n unsubstantiated request is not a certification”); In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693 (agreeing 
with collected cases measuring sufficiency of certification against 28 U.S.C. § 1746).  In Mingueta, 
however, the debtor made no explanation, let alone an unsubstantiated one.  In re Mingueta, 338 B.R. 
at 837. 
87. See In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623, 626 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005) (per curiam) (certification requires
simple description and need not be under oath); see also In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 296 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ky. 2005) (certification need not be under penalty of perjury). 
88. For example, does the debtor have to request counseling from more than one service?  Com-
pare In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. at 649 (“To allow the Debtor under these circumstances to fulfill his obli-
gation by contacting but a single credit counselor would reward token effort.”), with In re Hubbard, 
333 B.R. 377, 387 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (a debtor need not scour the field for available credit coun-
selors, but rather need only contact one).  Does a lawyer’s inquiry suffice?  In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 
385 (debtor may not rely on counsel’s general conclusion that services are unavailable, but may allow 
lawyer to make request specifically on her behalf).  Can a debtor file earlier than five days after first 
requesting counseling if she can show counseling would have been unavailable for the next five days in 
any event?  Compare In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. at 700 (“[W]hile the Court finds merit to the argument 
that the requirement probably should be five prepetition days, the Court cannot conclude that the 
plain reading of the statute supports that result.”), and In re Graham, 336 B.R. at 298 n.6 (“[I]f a 
debtor reasonably believes that he or she cannot reasonably complete the offered credit counseling 
within the five-day period, he or she need not wait until the end of the five-day period to file his or her 
bankruptcy petition.”), with In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602, 604 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (seeming to inter-
pret the five-day waiting period strictly). 
89. If the petition is “stricken” for ineligibility rather than “dismissed,” a debtor still will lose a
filing fee and automatic stay protection, but will not be a “repeat filer” upon returning to bankruptcy a 
second time within a year.  For cases in which the petition is stricken, see, for example, In re Salazar, 
339 B.R. 622 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (upholding validity of postbankruptcy foreclosure sale in 
stricken case where debtor was ineligible because of the lack of credit counseling); In re Rios, 336 B.R. 
117, 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 388 (deciding to strike filing due to 
BAPCPA-provided consequences of having prior case dismissed); cf., e.g., In re Tomco, 339 B.R. at 
161 (deciding that dismissal was necessary); In re Ross, 338 B.R. 134, 141 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) 
(concluding dismissal, rather than striking, is proper response). 
90. See, e.g., In re Dixon, 383 B.R. 383, 383 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (reviewing grant of waiver
under clear error standard due to discretionary nature of waiver request). 
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quirement will not be identified (if they do not file a waiver request) and 
will slip into the system unnoticed.91  In busy districts, this is especially 
likely to occur.  Also, the counseling requirement is becoming so easy to 
satisfy through short internet briefings that even defaulting mortgage 
borrowers may be able to satisfy the requirement before filing.92  Thus, 
the number of cases screened this way will likely be extremely small. 
B. Repeat Filers
BAPCPA also introduced a provision requiring higher scrutiny of 
repeat filers.93  This represents a stronger statutory charge to sort filers 
based on sustainable homeownership than the counseling provision. 
Prior to BAPCPA, a bankruptcy filer virtually always was protected by 
an automatic stay (with no affirmative showings) that enjoined all collec-
tion activity, including foreclosure.94  Creditors could seek to lift the 
automatic stay, but this entailed considerable cost.95  At least on the 
books, the new law shifts the burden sharply to the debtor if she fits the 
statutory definition of a repeat filer (e.g., if she has had a prior case dis-
missed in the past year).  The statute provides that the automatic stay 
will be terminated after thirty days if the debtor does not make affirma-
tive showings, noted below, to the judge’s satisfaction.96 
This provision clearly implicates defaulting mortgage borrowers, 
and intentionally so.97  Defaulting mortgage borrowers facing imminent 
91. See generally In re Tomco, 339 B.R. at 154–60 (agreeing with the Ross court); In re Ross, 338
B.R. at 140 (“Especially in a jurisdiction such as this one with a high volume of individual filings, it is 
quite conceivable that administration of an individual’s case might proceed despite § 109(h) ineligibil-
ity because the question does not immediately come to the attention of the court.”); id. at 141 (noting 
that some commentators believe the § 109(h) requirement is waivable).  Section 109 eligibility re-
quirements are generally thought not to be jurisdictional.  Thus, they do not prevent the receipt of 
relief if no one raises the issue.  Cf. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 109.06 (15th ed., rev. 2006) (dis-
cussing chapter 13 eligibility requirements). 
92. For a list of approved counselors, including many internet-based providers, see U.S. Trustee
Program, List of Credit Counseling Agencies Approved Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 111, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/cc_approved.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2006). 
93. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 302, 119 Stat. 23, 75–76 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)). 
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000). 
95. Id. 
96. See id. § 362(c)(3) (providing that stay terminates after 30 days for some filers).  Another
provision, § 362(c)(4), addresses debtors who have had two cases pending and dismissed within the 
prior year.  In such instances, the stay is not to go into effect at all unless a party in interest makes the 
requisite showing within thirty days.  To simplify the discussion, I focus only on § 362(c)(3). 
97. The home mortgage industry was a key supporter of this provision.  See, e.g., Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1998; Responsible Borrower Protection Act; and Consumer Lenders and Borrowers 
Bankruptcy Accountability Act of 1998: Hearing on H.R. 3150, H.R. 2500, and H.R. 3146 Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, 105th Cong. 148, 153–56 (1998) (testimony of Thomas H. 
Boone, Countrywide Home Loan, Inc.) (proposing additional provisions that would require an auto-
matic stay to be lifted in thirty days for repeat filer); Nat’l Bankr. Rev. Comm’n, Commission Meeting 
(Dec. 17, 1996) (statement of Garry Seligson, Vice President and General Counsel, Citicorp Consumer 
Asset Division) (proposing restrictions on repeat filing that require debtor to show significant change 
in circumstances demonstrating that she will be able to confirm and perform a plan); Memorandum 
from Eric Friedman, Countrywide Home Loans, to Melissa Jacoby and Elizabeth Warren, Professor of 
Law, Harvard Law School (April 14, 1997) (on file with author) (offering repeat filing statistics, re-
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foreclosure cannot wait to get beyond BAPCPA’s one year lookback pe-
riod, as other debtors might.98  Consequently, this provision increases the 
possibility that defaulting mortgage borrowers will have only short-term 
automatic stay protection unless they can justify extended protection.99  
Although not representative of the universe of cases, many of the pub-
licly available court decisions on repeat filing thus far involve chapter 13 
filers with mortgage delinquency.100 
The repeat filer’s “good faith” is a pivotal component of the 
debtor’s request for an extension of the automatic stay beyond thirty 
days.101  The statute delineates some factual circumstances to be consid-
ered, including whether the debtor has experienced a substantial change 
in the debtor’s “financial or personal affairs” since the dismissal of the 
prior case and whether there is “any other reason to conclude” that the 
debtor will complete the instant case successfully.102  To fill gaps in the 
statute regarding the meaning of good faith, courts have been resorting 
to multifactor and fact-driven tests of good faith in the common law that 
involve likelihood of fixing financial problems, including curing a mort-
gage.103
Screening chapter 13 repeat filers could be consistent with the goal 
of promoting sustainable homeownership without prolonging unsustain-
able homeownership.  It could help ensure that those who are allowed 
multiple chances to use chapter 13’s mortgagor protection features have 
a reasonable likelihood of success, and also might encourage mortgage 
servicers to allow a wider array of workout options with sustainable bor-
rowers.  Due to the posture of the required review, it would be difficult 
for judges to allocate this responsibility to chapter 13 trustees.  Ideally, 
porting that repeat filers comprised 10% of the bankruptcy filers they were servicing, and advocating 
for elimination of stay in repeat filings). 
98. See, e.g., Catrett, supra note 43, at 82 (“During 1999 and 2001, 50% of the sampled chapter
13 filings occurred on the Monday before and the morning of Foreclosure Tuesday, and in 2003, 40% 
of the filings occurred on those two days.  The automatic stay stops the auction on the courthouse 
steps.”). 
99. BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-08, § 311, 119 Stat. 23, 84–85 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(C)). 
100. For repeat filing cases involving looming home loss, see, for example, In re Easthope, No. 06-
20366, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 826 (Bankr. D. Utah Mar. 28, 2006); In re Ziolkowski, 338 B.R. 543 (Bankr. 
D. Conn. 2006); In re Baldassaro, 338 B.R. 178 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006); In re Kurtzahn, 337 B.R. 356
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2006); In re Parker, 336 B.R. 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Ball, 336 B.R. 268
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006); In re Warneck, 336 B.R. 181 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Johnson, 335 B.R. 
805 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2006); In re Collins, 335 B.R. 646 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). 
101. BAPCPA § 302, 119 Stat. at 75 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)) (providing that party in inter-
est may move for stay continuation and must demonstrate that the filing “is in good faith as to the 
creditors to be stayed”). 
102. Id.  See generally Richardo I. Kilpatrick, Selected Creditor Issues Under the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 817, 823 (2005) (noting 
that the provision may require “mini-confirmation hearings”). 
103. See, e.g., In re Baldassaro, 338 B.R. at 187–88 (adjusting the First Circuit good faith test); In 
re Ball, 336 B.R. at 274; In re Mark, 336 B.R. 260, 265–67 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006); In re Havner, 336 B.R. 
98, 103–04 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006); In re Galanis, 334 B.R. 685, 692–93 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005); In re 
Montoya, 333 B.R. 449, 458–60 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005). 
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however, it should lead debtors’ lawyers to engage in more due diligence 
of their potential debtor clients’ likelihood of financial recovery, both in 
a first filing and in a repeat filing. 
Notwithstanding the potential of this new repeat filing provision to 
sort individuals on the basis of homeownership sustainability, statutory 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code tend to have a more modest impact 
than their appearance on paper would suggest.104  Preferring the role of 
arbiter of disputes to system gatekeeper, some judges may be reluctant to 
deny a defaulting mortgage borrower’s request for a stay extension 
unless creditors actively oppose it.105 
In addition, as suggested in the discussion of the credit counseling 
provision, BAPCPA’s provisions are remarkably susceptible to a wide 
array of statutory interpretations.106  The repeat filing provision is drafted 
particularly poorly, leading to some recent judicial interpretations that 
may significantly mute the screening function I envision.  For example, 
under one interpretation, terminating the stay frees only those creditors 
who have taken formal action against the debtor (lawsuits, garnishment, 
104. See generally Jacoby, supra note 34, at 176–82. 
105. See In re Beasley, 339 B.R. 472 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006); In re Phillips, 336 B.R. 818, 870
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006) (“Attorneys who practice before this Court are advised that if their Motion 
to Extend the Automatic Stay is unopposed, the Court may grant the Motion under certain circum-
stances without the necessity of a hearing.”); In re Warneck, 336 B.R. 181, 182 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(“Where no presumption of bad faith arises, and where no party objects, a request to extend the 
automatic stay should be liberally granted.”); In re Charles, 332 B.R. 538 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).  In 
an earlier writing, I predicted that the efficacy of this provision would depend on creditor vigilance 
because some judges believed that debtors may need multiple opportunities to succeed in chapter 13 
repayment plans.  See Jacoby, supra note 34, at 179–80. 
106. There are multiple theories to explain the drafting choices.  Complex and uncertain new
gatekeepers, plus the additional uncertainty of judicial discretion, may have furthered the drafters’ 
goal of imposing costs to arbitrarily thin the ranks of bankruptcy filers.  See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 7, 
at 262–66 (identifying discharge reduction function of bankruptcy reform legislation).  It is not clear, 
of course, that deterring bankruptcy filings will automatically increase lenders’ profits.  See, e.g., Sumit 
Agarwal et al., Exemption Laws and Consumer Delinquency and Bankruptcy Behavior: An Empirical 
Analysis of Credit Card Data, 43 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 273 (2003).  The BAPCPA screens may have 
been attractive to proponents because of the ways in which they might favorably alter their leverage in 
nonbankruptcy negotiations.  However, one cannot rule out the “legislative monster” theory, namely 
that the bankruptcy system has grown into something sufficiently complex that Congress cannot un-
derstand it well enough to predict the effects of amendments.  See L. Gordon Crovitz, How the RICO 
Monster Mauled Wall Street, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1050, 1051 (1990) (noting that Congress in-
tended RICO for use against crime syndicates but it has been applied to “legitimate businesses”); 
Garrett E. Land, Judicial Assessment or Judicial Notice? An Evaluation of the Admissibility Standards 
for DNA Evidence and Proposed Solutions to Repress the Current Efforts to Expand Forensic DNA 
Capabilities, 9 J. MED. & L. 95, 114 (2005) (“DNA legislation has produced a monster . . . . ”).  Con-
gress’ reliance on interest groups has the potential to ameliorate or exacerbate the legislative monster 
problem.  Professors Nourse and Schacter’s study of the Senate Judiciary Committee suggests that 
Congressional actors were more inclined to delegate authority to lobbyists regarding BAPCPA than 
on other legislative items.  See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Draft-
ing: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 587–88 (2002).  Institutions engaged in con-
sumer lending activities likely delegated the drafting and lobbying tasks to government affairs lawyers 
rather than employees who understood the inner workings of bankruptcy.  Government affairs lawyers 
are less well-suited to fine tune the system in more substantive and sophisticated ways. 
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liens) prior to the bankruptcy filing.107  Under another, terminating the 
stay does not free creditors seeking to pursue property of the estate, such 
as a home subject to a defaulted mortgage loan, from the stay.108  The lat-
ter interpretation, if adopted more broadly, will substantially hinder the 
ability of mortgage servicers to pursue foreclosure even when a filer can-
not show that her current circumstances are likely to enable her to cure 
her arrearage and continue with her payments. 
Finally, the provision applies to only a subset of repeat filers who 
have a relatively short gap between their cases.109  This will not capture 
all repeaters who avoid foreclosure through multiple bankruptcy fil-
ings.110  Thus, as with the credit counseling waiver review, this new provi-
sion is significantly underinclusive with respect to screening for home-
ownership sustainability. 
V. CONCLUSION
Instruments of housing policy appear in unexpected places.111  Al-
though scholars of mortgage debt and foreclosure generally are aware 
that some bankruptcy filers own homes, chapter 13’s specific anti-
foreclosure function has not received sufficient scholarly attention. 
Thus, this article aims to encourage more critical analysis of the role of 
chapter 13 as part of a larger mortgagor protection scheme at a time 
when both bankruptcy law and the home mortgage market are in flux. 
Although firmer conclusions will depend on the result of further 
study of chapter 13 as mortgagor protection law, this article has sought to 
examine the assumption that prolonging homeownership in all instances 
is consistent with promoting sustainable homeownership.  Thus, reform 
efforts that encourage the sorting of defaulting homeowners or encour-
age cheaper, more targeted, nonbankruptcy workouts ultimately may be 
beneficial to the overall scheme.  These considerations provide an alter-
107. See In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Paschal, 337 B.R. 277, 278
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).  As an interesting twist, this interpretation serves as an incentive for creditors 
to engage in formal, rather than informal, collection activity across the board, which is a subject of 
recent media interest. 
108. See In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006); In re Johnson, 335 B.R. 805, 806
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2006).  Although the House Committee Report says little other than restating the 
statutory language, it gives the impression of a complete termination of the automatic stay.  See H. 
REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 69 (2005). 
109. See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 301, 119 Stat. 23, 75 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)). 
110. See In re Blinco, No. 3:06-BK-01569-GLP, 2006 WL 2471961 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Aug. 28,
2006) (repeat filer not falling within new restriction); In re Gould, No. 06-12324-WCH, 2006 WL 
2403562 (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2006) (husband and wife alternate filings not falling within new 
restrictions).  The amount of time a defaulting mortgage borrower can wait between chapter 13 filings 
depends in part on the details of state law that set forth foreclosure timetables.  See Debra Pogrond 
Stark, Foreclosing on the American Dream: An Evaluation of State and Federal Foreclosure Laws, 51 
OKLA. L. REV. 229, 257–67 (1998) (providing fifty-state survey of time-to-completion of foreclosure 
process); Nelson & Whitman, supra note 9, at 1407. 
111. Cf. Michael A. Stegman et al., The Earned Income Tax Credit as an Instrument of Housing
Policy, 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 203 (2004). 
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native framework in which to evaluate the 2005 amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
